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THESIS

THE CURRENT SOVIET PEACE PROGRAM IN ITS
LARGER CONTEXT

by

John M. Brown

June 1988

Thesis Advisor

David S. Yost

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The Current Soviet Peace Program in its Larger Context

by

John M. Brown
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1976

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to advance understanding of the probable intentions of the current Soviet leadership in their initiatives for peace, cooperation, and disarmament. This study concludes that, rather than embodying new political thinking that might evoke well- founded hope in the West for genuine peace and stability, Soviet initiatives reflect a long-term Soviet orientation toward unilateral strategic advantage. The West should therefore respond to these initiatives with caution and vigilance. The primary methodology of this study is qualitative content analysis of key expressions of Soviet policy by authoritative spokesmen. Two areas of background to contemporary Soviet peace programs, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-75, and Soviet commentary on U.S. nuclear freeze movements in 1980-84, are examined as well.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The current General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, in the closing paragraph of his book, *Perestroika*, wrote,

We want freedom to reign supreme in the coming century everywhere in the world. We want peaceful competition between different social systems to develop unimpeded, to encourage mutually advantageous cooperation rather than confrontation and an arms race. We want people of every country to enjoy prosperity, welfare and happiness. The road to this lies through proceeding to a nuclear-free, non-violent world. We have embarked on this road, and call on other countries and nations to follow suit. [Ref. 1: p. 254]

By themselves, these words emanate hope for a better tomorrow. Is there more meaning contained in this paragraph than is at first apparent? Does the best and brightest hope for the future really lie in the international designs of the CPSU alluded to here?

The answer to these questions should begin with an understanding of the context in which Gorbachev's statements are presented. Two sides of this context are evident. The first is linguistic, and the second is the background of the audience. On the linguistic side, Soviet expressions of a peaceful and conciliatory nature have been clarified in the past by an examination of their background. Consider this example offered by Stanley Kober. It involves Lenin's statement that "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism." This statement was quoted by Andrei Gromyko in a major speech in 1983, and by Constantin Chernenko in a 1985 letter to a Canadian student published in *Kommunist*. Both men cited this quotation by Lenin to underscore the peaceful and nonthreatening intentions of the Soviet Union. The seemingly nonthreatening and "confidence-building" ring of Lenin's words is dispelled by the context in which Lenin framed them.

Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. There will be no wars in socialist society; consequently, disarmament will be achieved. But whoever expects that socialism will be achieved *without* a social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a socialist. Dictatorship is state power based on *violence*. And in the twentieth century -- as in the age of civilization generally -- violence means neither a fist nor a club, but troops. To put "disarmament" in the program is tantamount to making the general declaration: We are opposed to the use of arms. There is as little Marxism in this as there would be if we were to say: We are opposed to violence! [Ref. 2: p.198]

More will be said later about the theme of *disarmament* in key Soviet statements, and about General Secretary Gorbachev's interpretations of Lenin and the history of the Soviet period. The point here is the necessity for Western audiences to be attentive to the *context* of Soviet statements of conciliation and peace.

A second element of the context of Soviet statements is the medium of understanding with which they are expected to be received in the West. This involves the background of the listener. In order for Western listeners to understand the intent of the Soviet proposals which are directed to them, these prospective targets need to gain insight regarding how the Soviets frame these appeals.

Gorbachev, in the opening paragraphs of *Perestroika*, says

In writing this book, it has been my desire to address directly the peoples of the USSR, the United States, indeed every country.

I have met government and other leaders of many states and representatives of their public, but the purpose of this book is to talk without intermediaries to the citizens of the whole world about things that, without exception, concern us all.

I have written this book because I believe in their common sense. I am convinced that they, like me, worry about the future of our planet. This is the most important matter. [Ref. 1: p. 9]

In these paragraphs, the General Secretary makes a public announcement of his plans for a new world order, some details of which he outlined in the book's concluding paragraph cited earlier. How the Soviets gauge the receptivity of Western audiences to these appeals for peace therefore constitutes a most important second element of the context in which the appeals are framed.

B. HYPOTHESIS

Far from embodying new political thinking that might evoke well-founded hope in the West for genuine peace and stability, current Soviet initiatives for "peace, cooperation, and disarmament" reflect a long-term Soviet orientation toward unilateral strategic advantage; the West should therefore respond to these initiatives with vigilance and caution.

C. PLAN FOR EXPLORING HYPOTHESIS

The primary methodology of this study is qualitative content analysis of key expressions of Soviet policy by authoritative spokesmen. Two areas of background to contemporary Soviet peace programs, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-75, and Soviet commentary on U.S. nuclear freeze movement, in 1980-84, are examined as well.

D. ANALYTICAL ASSUMPTIONS

The reader should be aware of the assumptions that have influenced this study:

1. The Soviet Union has engaged the West in a long-term competition and seeks unilateral strategic advantage.
2. This struggle is carried on by the Soviets on every level available to them: military, diplomatic, informational, espionage and so forth.
3. The Soviet concept of the correlation of forces is valuable in that it illustrates how the Soviets see this spectrum of strategic efforts as an organic whole.
4. Soviet initiatives and communications are assumed to be carefully phrased political statements.
5. The General Secretary is seen as a spokesman for the collective leadership of the Politburo.
6. The General Secretary speaks to two audiences. The first is the CPSU and the second is the external target audience.
7. Soviet messages for Western target audiences are not meaningless. This assumption requires the following qualifications: the first being that the true meaning often lies beneath the surface and the second that the Soviet leadership's true intent is frequently misunderstood, since Western publics are generally uninformed about the Soviet Union's ideological foundations and modes of communication. The Soviets are aware of this widespread lack of knowledge in Western societies, and expect Western audiences to interpret Soviet statements within Western frameworks of understanding.

II. THE CSCE -- ORIGINS TO THE FINAL ACT

A. INTRODUCTION

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed August 1, 1975 by 35 countries, including the United States and Canada) is not a treaty. It is not a legally binding instrument. It is a statement of political will made by the nations that signed it. As such, the wording of the Final Act, the negotiations that brought it into being, and the political interpretations of its content are rich areas in which to gain insight regarding the nature of the struggle between the two main systems represented at the conference -- the democracies of the West and the totalitarian regimes of the East.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the CSCE Final Act in the light of the protracted political and military competition between West and East. To this end, eight themes are examined:

1. Background and chronology of the CSCE
2. Negotiating characteristics of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
3. Language and word choice
4. Analysis of the text of the Final Act
5. Political will
6. Detente and disarmament
7. Human rights
8. Conclusions

This chapter is focused on the Final Act -- on its content, its development and its subsequent use in political statements. This scope is intentionally narrow and exclusive of the continuing history of the followup conferences that have been held since 1975. Additionally, the writer recognizes that the simplification of the CSCE dialogue to an East-West struggle entails a degree of distortion, because it does not assess the role that the neutral and nonaligned participants played in the conference.

B. BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY

The 35 signatures subscribed to the Final Act were penned by ten presidents, seventeen prime ministers, four first secretaries of communist parties, two foreign ministers and two personal representatives of heads of state. The large number of signators and the varieties of their titles testify to the grand scale and political diversity represented at the nearly two years of continuous negotiations that produced the Final Act.

Milestones on the long road to the CSCE began with the Warsaw Pact's Bucharest Declaration of 1965 that called for a European conference to settle issues of recognition of borders and normalization of relations between states that had been unresolved since the end of World War II.¹ This call for a European conference was repeated in 1969 in the form of the "Budapest Appeal" that focused on conditions for recognition of the partition of Germany. Later that same year the NATO ministers' meeting in Washington issued a reply which made the participation of the U.S. and Canada in any "all European" talks a precondition for such a conference. On April 5, 1969, Finland offered to host both the preparatory talks and the conference. During the remainder of 1969 refinement of the scope and preconditions for the conference continued to be worked out between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

During 1970 several major steps toward the conference were taken. The first was an exchange of ministerial communiques between NATO (May) and the WTO (June). NATO suggested a two part agenda for the conference that covered the principles governing relations between states, and freer exchanges and cooperation between states. The WTO accepted both the participation of the U.S. and Canada and the Alliance's broadening of the agenda. This exchange witnessed the conception of the twin themes of the conference that would provide so much contention in the womb of deliberations and eventually provide both blocs with the ability to claim political victory after the Final Act was signed.

A second breakthrough in 1970 was the signing of the FRG-USSR and FRG-Poland treaties of renunciation of force. These treaties were early trophies of the *Ostpolitik* of the FRG's Chancellor, Willy Brandt. The 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (signed by the Soviets after the Bundestag approved it in the spring of 1972) symbolized the removal of the final impediment to convening the conference.

Multilateral preparatory talks began in Helsinki on November 22, 1972 and were completed on June 8, 1973. These preparatory talks produced a document, "Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations," which outlined the organization, agenda and procedural rules that were followed during deliberations. Most notable among these procedural rules was that of *consensus* which it defined as,

Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus. Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of objection expressed by a Representative and, sub-

¹ This chronology was drawn from John Maresca's eyewitness account and analysis of the CSCE contained in Reference 3.

mitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question. [Ref. 3: p. 221]

This rule of consensus was a great equalizer for the smaller states as it gave them an equal voice with the larger states in the negotiations.

After these preparatory talks, three phases of the CSCE followed. Phase I, conducted on the ministerial level, met between the third and seventh of July, 1973 and July 21, 1975 in Geneva, Switzerland. Phase II, held July 30th and August 1st, 1975 in Helsinki, ended the conference with the signing of the Final Act. Plans for followup meetings were written into the Final Act. Additionally, various Experts' Meetings were planned on specific topics.

This skeleton chronology reveals several points that are key to understanding the nature and context of the CSCE. One of these points is that the conference was a Warsaw Pact initiative of the 1960's (with roots in the 1950's and earlier) that was eventually embraced by NATO in the 1970's. The bipolar nature of the origins of the conference should not be lost in the egalitarian character of the deliberations that were guided by the principle of consensus.

C. U.S. AND SOVIET NEGOTIATING CHARACTERISTICS

This section will not give a detailed chronological description of the negotiations that took place during Phase II of the CSCE. Additionally, since a later section of this chapter will address the Final Act itself and give an overview of its content, a description of the results of the negotiations here would be premature. Instead, this section will focus on several distinctive features of the styles of the U.S. and Soviet teams, the champion states of the two negotiating blocs.

1. U.S. Negotiating Style

The initial U.S. posture at the conference was relaxed and supportive of its alliance partners. The U.S. had concluded major bilateral agreements with the U.S.S.R. prior to the conference on nearly every area of cooperation and security that would eventually be included in the Final Act [Ref. 4: p. 245]. The spirit of the day was detente when the negotiations began. The conference offered the Nixon administration an opportunity to enhance American prestige abroad while it disentangled the nation from the war in Vietnam. Believing that it had little at risk, the U.S. administration was free to play a supporting actor role to its European alliance partners' lead. This relaxed negotiating style would stiffen into a more resistant and less conciliatory one as the confer-

ence proceeded, in response to domestic political pressures [Ref 3: p. 46]. These pressures will be described later in this chapter.

2. Soviet Negotiating Style

It does the Soviet delegation no slight to describe their style as resembling the techniques of psychological warfare. A sampling of two of the twenty Soviet negotiating techniques described by John Maresca supports this evaluation.

Hinting at hard liners back in Moscow. Occasionally, the Soviets would attempt to persuade Western delegates to accept a position because doing so would strengthen the hands of those in the Kremlin who favored detente in their dealings with Moscow hawks. This reasoning was, of course, advanced only in private contacts and on a "personal" basis, but it was nevertheless effective at times, especially with Western delegates who fancied themselves Sovietologists or who liked to think they were having an effect on the internal Soviet power struggle.

Intimidation. The Soviets also used a variety of personal pressures to advance their own ideas. They commonly sought to intimidate individual Western delegates who took vigorous positions the Soviets disliked. Intimidation was carried out through public ridicule, heaping abuse on a delegate or on his position in an open meeting, or usually in more private circumstances, by a sometimes unnerving display of anger, complete with threats to ruin the delegate's career. In some instances, the Soviets actually did complain about individual Western delegates to their sponsoring governments, something to which most career diplomats are extremely sensitive, even though complaints from the Soviets should in most cases be regarded as compliments. [Ref. 3: pp. 61-62]

One of the greatest values of the CSCE experience may be the lessons it has to offer as a case study in negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviets entered the negotiations with a strength of purpose built up over the long years they worked for the conference. They came to Geneva with a detailed draft proposal that included broadly worded principles such as,

...sovereign equality, non-resort to the threat or use of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, peaceful settlements of disputes, non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for human rights and the basic freedoms, equality and the right of peoples to decide their own future, cooperation between states, honest fulfillment of obligations under international law. [Ref. 5: p. 14]

Apparently there was something precious to the Soviets locked inside language of that type, for they fought a hard fight to preserve its integrity. Before leaving this topic, consider Maresca's advice for future diplomats involved in negotiations with the Soviets.

The CSCE experience showed once again that the Soviets are deeply prudent negotiators. Their overriding priorities are defensive -- not to lose anything they already have, whether it be territory, military superiority, or tactical advantage . . . They are sharp traders and never give away something for nothing. Their bureaucracy permits no idle whims, personal idiosyncrasies, independent actions, or informal

probes. Faced with such an adversary, our negotiators must be at least as well organized, as disciplined, and as patient as the Russians. If we are as firm at summit meetings as our negotiators are when they are bound by specific instructions, the Soviets will have to deal with our positions; if we are not, the Soviets will understand that our negotiating positions are meaningless. [Ref. 3: p. 63]

D. LANGUAGE AND WORD CHOICE

Problems of translation and word choice are traditional factors of international negotiations and diplomacy. Lawyers, translators and multilingual diplomats all had key roles in the CSCE negotiations. Out of these talks emerged many curious instances that underscored the problems posed by language in international events. Four are described here.

The first curiosity is that the conference was conducted in no less than six official languages -- English, Russian, French, German, Spanish and Italian.

The second curiosity is the unusual role that the German language played at the conference. It was spoken by five nations that participated in the conference: FRG, GDR, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. This five nation group carried on parallel consultations during the conference on wording of sections of the Final Act as they neared completion. The results of this linguistic cooperation between German speaking NATO, WTO and neutral states served to enhance the value and the authority of the German text of the Final Act. [Ref. 3: p. 22]

The third curiosity was the Soviet delegation's use of the translation problem to their advantage. Russian is an intricate language that is not studied in the West as much as it should be, given the prominence of the Soviet Union on the world scene. When it was to the Soviet delegation's advantage to do so, it took the position that "No one really understands Russian except a native speaker." Impasse points like this were usually breached only when Western delegations brought native speakers of Russian to bear on the problem. [Ref. 3: p. 61]

A fourth curiosity was the shade of meaning and implications of critical word choices. One example was the verb tense ambiguity generated in a section of the Final Act regarding the legitimacy of territorial acquisitions. Here the Soviet delegation accepted wording which seemed to be contrary to their implied agenda of international recognition of their gains made in World War II. Harold Russel, principal negotiator for the Basket One negotiations, describes this apparent oversight by saying,

The U.S.S.R. accepted this formulation because it mistakenly concluded that this language could only be read prospectively as applying to future occupations and

acquisitions of territory in the first sentence, in that the style of all the principles, uses the future tense. [Ref. 4: p. 265]

Such is the level of attention to language demanded in international negotiations.

The Conference formally recorded its concern for the problems of language and translation in European affairs by resolving in Part Four of Basket Three to encourage language education.

E. ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL ACT

The choice of a *final act* as the legal instrument to record the results of the CSCE was made because of its uniquely nonbinding nature. The broad scope of the issues to be discussed was recognized from the outset, and a broad, general instrument was chosen. The legal nature of a final act fit this context the best. [Ref. 4: p. 246]

Two important principles were established early in the negotiations. The first was that the CSCE Final Act would be subordinated to the principles guiding relations between states embodied in Article 103 of the U.N. Charter [Ref. 4: p. 263]. This decision established the relationship between the CSCE and the worldwide international forum of the U.N. The second principle was that the obligation of signatory states to abide by the provisions of the Final Act would be nonbinding, and follow "recognized principles of international law."² On one hand these ambiguous qualifiers may be seen as limiting the value of the Final Act. On the other hand, it is doubtful that any other course could have been taken. The CSCE Final Act was not a peace treaty that was imposed on a defeated nation. It was more of a "memorandum of understanding" between 35 nations that conferred as co-equals.

The topics considered during Phase II of the CSCE were grouped into three general categories called "baskets." The first basket contained topics involving security and confidence in Europe. The second basket contained topics concerned with cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. Basket three contained topics concerned with cooperation in humanitarian areas.

The "beginning and the end" of the document contain revealing insights regarding the significance of the Final Act. Consider the statement of resolve and intent in the general preamble to the document (the last three paragraphs of the preamble).

Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and coop-

² Principle Ten of Basket One Section One of the CSCE Final Act. The text used in this study was reprinted in *Department of State Bulletin* and is listed as Reference 6.

eration as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of the world.

Determined, in consequence, to give full effect to the results of the conference and to assure, among their States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from those results and thus to broaden, deepen, and make continuing and lasting the process of detente.

The High Representatives of the participating States have solemnly adopted the following: [Ref. 6: p. 323]

These three short paragraphs express the major themes of the conference:

- Political will
- Peace
- Security
- Justice
- Cooperation
- Rapprochement
- Detente

Two of these themes -- political will and detente -- will be treated in depth in later sections of this chapter.

The last sentence of the general preamble refers to the signators as the "High Representatives" of their states. As mentioned earlier, the secretaries of ruling communist parties were included among those signators. This fact brings up a noteworthy technical point -- that in the context of traditional international law, the head of a communist party is *not* a head of state. One West German jurist, writing in the *American Journal of International Law* stated,

Therefore, in sociological and political terms, the East European Communist parties are in law more like insurgent movements than like traditional political parties of the Western type. They are *de facto* sovereign in their respective states. [Ref. 7: p. 322]

A Soviet ideologist would probably label this legal analysis as "bourgeois formalism." In contrast to this Western viewpoint, consider this short excerpt from Brezhnev's speech at Helsinki on the eve of his signing the Final Act.

The special political importance and moral force of the agreements reached at the conference lie in the fact that they are to be certified by signatures of the top leaders of the participating states. To make these agreements effective is our common, most important objective.

We proceed from the assumption that all of the countries represented at the conference will translate into life the agreements reached. As regards the Soviet Union it will act precisely in this manner. [Ref. 8: p. 94]

By referring to himself as the top leader of his state, Brezhnev invited a comparison with other leaders that says something about the nature of Soviet political power. The

Soviet General Secretary is not a head of state in the classic sense. He is not a dynastic ruler related to other rulers by blood and custom. He is not the spokesman of a popular mandate from his countrymen. He is the leader of a party that has thoroughly invested a state, the chief of a self-perpetuating oligarchy, legitimized by the claims of an ideology. (It should be noted that, while Brezhnev later became the U.S.S.R.'s formal head of state in 1977 -- Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet -- his position in 1975, at the time he signed the Helsinki Final Act, was simply that of General Secretary of the CPSU.) Considering the second paragraph of the above quotation, it is well to remember that the Soviet state is not bound by self-restraint to be consistent in word and action.

As mentioned earlier, the Final Act was not intended to be a legally binding treaty or charter. Setting conjectures on hidden intentions by negotiating blocs aside, the text itself reveals an agenda of hope and idealism. Three ideals that emerge from the text are: *detente*, *cooperation* and *confidence*.

The word *detente* occurs in the text seven times, always in terms of hope to expand or extend or make lasting the process of *detente*. For reasons of evidence far beyond a textual analysis of the Final Act, *detente* appears to be the key concept of the CSCE. As such, it will be treated in its own section of this chapter.

The term *cooperation* is part of the title of the conference and occurs in nearly every article of the Final Act.

Confidence was linked to security in the text. Presumably this confidence, this belief or faith in another, was to be applied to one's opposites in the other camp, and that security was to emerge from confidence that one's opponents had renounced aggression.

In these three terms, the Final Act is an optimistic expression of faith, for as the Scriptures define faith, it is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen." [Ref. 9: Hebrews 11: 1] Each state, for its own reasons, subscribed to this article of faith when it signed the document.

Interestingly, elements of this hopeful and idealistic Final Act have found new life in two central documents of the CPSU -- the 1985 revision of the Party Program, and the 1977 "Brezhnev" Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

In Part Three (entitled "The Tasks of the CPSU on the International Scene, in the Drive for Peace and Social Progress"), Section II (entitled "Relations with Capitalist Countries. Struggle for a Lasting Peace and Disarmament"), the Program says:

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union firmly and consistently upholds the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The policy of peaceful coexistence as understood by the CPSU presupposes: renunciation of war and the use or threat of force as a means of settling disputed issues, and their settlement through negotiations; non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the legitimate interests of each other; the right of the peoples independently to decide their destinies; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders; cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit; fulfilment in good faith of commitments arising from generally recognized principles and norms of international law and from international treaties concluded. [Ref. 10: p. 94]

This passage is very close to the wording of the Final Act. Here the guiding writ of the CPSU drafted in 1985 is congruent with the lofty sentiments of the 1975 Final Act.

The Soviet Constitution of 1977, notably in Articles 28, 29 and 30, reflects an incorporation of the language of detente. Articles 28 and 30 deleted polemical references to world capitalism, while Article 29 has more direct statements of the themes of the Final Act written into it [Ref. 11: p. 255]. Brezhnev, writing in *World Marxist Review*, confirmed this analysis when he said,

Yet another aspect of the international importance of the new Soviet constitution is that in both spirit and letter it serves the cause of peace, the security of the peoples, the strengthening of the anti-imperialist solidarity of all progressive forces . . . By including in the new constitution a special chapter enacting the peaceful character of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, our people have once again stressed their determination to follow the Leninist course of peace, the course of ridding humanity of the horrors of war, of the material hardships and mortal dangers implicit in the arms race. This chapter contains clauses corresponding to the fundamental obligations that the Soviet Union has undertaken as a participant in vital international agreements including the Final Act of the Helsinki conference. Indisputably this imparts additional weight to the efforts that are being made in the world for a further normalization of the international situation, for the development of detente. [Ref. 8: p. 199]

Here we see the language of hope expressed in the Final Act "turned on its head" by the then "high representative" of the Soviet Union. Noting the year of this article as 1977, the invocation of the Final Act as a legitimizing element of the new constitution seems ironic in light of the Soviet revolutionary involvements in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Mozambique that were then underway. This comparison of repeated Soviet conciliatory themes (such as normalization, detente and peaceful coexistence) with Soviet international conduct yields the impression that Western listeners to Soviet conciliatory language should be wary and vigilant, not confident and secure regarding Soviet expressions of goodwill.

F. POLITICAL WILL

The general preamble to the Final Act states that the signatory nations were "motivated by the political will, in the interest of their peoples." This section is devoted to analysis and conjecture regarding the impetus of the political wills that operated in the U.S. and Soviet CSCE negotiating moves. We are freer to analyze expressions of U.S. political will of that day because there is much on the record in the form of reporting contemporary to the conference, and of subsequent analysis. The secretive nature of the Soviet state limits us to less definite footing in conjecture and inference.

1. U.S. Political Will

American political will was rocked by a succession of shocks before, throughout, and after the CSCE. The withdrawal from Vietnam, with its attendant effect of causing America to be wary of involvement in Third World conflicts, was followed by the domestic shock of the Watergate scandal and the resignation of President Nixon. This was part of the turbulent background of the American experience during the years of the CSCE. Writing in retrospect, after the end of the Nixon presidency, Kissinger penned this epilogue, commenting on the drama outlined above,

We will never know what might have been possible had America not consumed its authority in that melancholy period. Congressional assaults on a weakened President robbed him of both the means of containment and the incentives for Soviet moderation, rendering resistance impotent and at the same time driving us toward a confrontation without a strategy or the means to back it up. The domestic base for our approach to East-West relations eroded. We lost the carrot in the debate over Jewish emigration that undercut the 1972 trade agreement with the Soviet Union. And the stick became ineffective as a result of progressive restrictions on executive authority from 1973 to 1976 that doomed Indochina to destruction, hamstringing the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief, blocked military assistance to key allies, and nearly devastated our intelligence agencies. In time, the Soviets could not resist the opportunity presented by a weakened President and a divided America, abdicating from foreign responsibilities. By 1975 Soviet adventurism had returned, reinforced by an unprecedented panoply of modern arms. [Ref. 12: p. 246]

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. negotiating style was reserved and conciliatory in the early stages of the CSCE. The conference was seen as valuable to the Nixon Administration as a forum for enhancing American status abroad. The tougher negotiating stance and strengthening of resolve on human rights issues were results of two domestic political pressures: the unraveling of the Nixon presidency and disdain for the *Realpolitik* that Kissinger represented. Maresca confirms this interpretation of events and adds that by the end of the negotiations that the U.S. "held its normal leadership

position in the Western group." [Ref. 3: p. 46] It was as though the ship of state returned to its preset course of opposition to Soviet political will. To broadly summarize, this analysis of U.S. political will during the period of CSCE highlights a profound contrast with that of the Soviet Union. The U.S. president is a representative of an electoral mandate. He remains accountable to the public will as he executes both his domestic and international responsibilities.

2. Soviet Political Will

In contrast to the democratic concept of popular mandate and accountability to the electorate that are common to the U.S. and her Western alliance partners, the Soviet Union is a "party-archy" and operates under the guidance of a completely different sort of political will.

Using the acuity of vision that only hindsight can give, one can interpret the "Peace Program" introduced in the 24th CPSU Congress in 1970 as preparatory groundwork for the CSCE and the CSCE as preparatory for the aggressive revolutionary gambits of the Soviet state that followed in the latter half of the 1970's. Part of the apparent Soviet desire to conclude the CSCE quickly has been attributed to Brezhnev's desire to be able to report its successful conclusion, thus vindicating his "peace program" to the 25th Party Congress. His address to that Party Congress, delivered February 24th, 1976 reflected this idea of the instrumentality of the Final Act to the CPSU's international strategies [Ref. 8: p. 104]. The historical evidence suggests that the Soviet peace program of that day, the CSCE, and detente itself were Soviet moves to ensure that "all would remain quiet on the Western front" while the U.S.S.R. shifted its expansionist focus to the Third World front and continued its nuclear and conventional force buildup.

To summarize, Soviet political will is monopolized by the Communist Party. The only mandate is that of the Party elite. The General Secretary is accountable to no one other than this elite. In the matter of political will, as shown in the CSCE context, the Soviet state is so unlike Western states as to be beyond comparison.

G. DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT

The subject of detente is broad, emotional, and controversial. As a means of resisting the temptation to broaden the focus of this chapter into the vast plain of the topic of detente, let us focus on the text of the Final Act. As was mentioned earlier, the word *detente* emerges as one of the key words of the text. The preamble to Section Two of Basket I contains a revealing statement which, without claiming to do so, gives us a

concise definition of detente when it says, "The participating states, *Desirous* of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world:" To paraphrase, this statement says that detente is intended to bring about a relaxation of East-West political tension that, it is hoped, will reduce the risk of military conflict.

Detente may easily be seen as the driving theme for the CSCE from the Soviet perspective. One history of the period refers to the Final Act as the "long awaited fruit of detente" for the Soviets [Ref. 13: p. 641]. This assessment of its value would appear to be accurate when compared to the importance the Soviets attached to the Final Act by weaving it into their constitution and party program. The value and usefulness of the Final Act to Soviet foreign policy was underscored in an article in *International Affairs* (Moscow) where the *Izvestia* political analyst Vikenti Matveyev linked the following concepts in sequential paragraphs as he described "The Soviet Factor" in Western foreign policy:

1. The Soviet Union's achievement of military-strategic parity with the U.S. in the late 1960's
2. The abandonment of U.S. military superiority for "the most expedient doctrine" of adequacy in the military field by the "anti-communist" President Nixon
3. "New vistas" opened up by bilateral and multilateral agreements in the 1970's
4. The "milestone" of the CSCE Final Act. [Ref. 14: p. 47]

H. HUMAN RIGHTS

The Final Act has had a split personality since its conception. The original Soviet political and territorial agenda was broadened by the NATO inclusion of humanitarian issues. This dichotomy of purpose continued throughout the negotiations and into subsequent political commentary. Indeed, in America the Final Act is usually referred to as "The Helsinki Accords" with this term being synonymous with human rights. If the Final Act is a record of the "gains of detente" for the Soviets, it is contrarywise a reminder of Soviet excessive and arbitrary use of power in dealing with its own citizens. In this respect, the Final Act can be said to be an important political tool for Western democracies. It has proven to be of lesser value as a tool of influence over Soviet behavior. The Final Act contained significant disclaimers as to the obligations of states to uphold it. One modest piece of evidence of the value of the human rights issue is that it bothers the Soviets. Matveyev, writing in the same chronological analysis of Western

foreign policy cited earlier, implies that criticism of the Soviet Union for human rights violations represents a twisting of the Final Act's purposes [Ref. 14: p. 47].

To summarize, it is a good and proper thing for America and the West to pressure the Soviets on the human rights issue. It is, after all, "our half" of the split personality of the Final Act, and a very fundamental point of distinction between our system and theirs.

I. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter was directed toward an examination of primary sources, firsthand accounts and authoritative analyses in order to gain an understanding of the textual denotation and political connotations of the Final Act of the CSCE. Close reading and interpretation of various pertinent sources have yielded several conclusions:

1. An appreciation for the absolutely critical role played by semantics and foreign languages in intense international negotiations.
2. The conciliatory language of CSCE as appropriated by Soviet leadership did not represent a moderating change in Soviet strategy for foreign relations, as evidenced by the period of expansion that directly followed the conference.
3. The appropriation of peaceful language by the Soviet leadership is not a new phenomenon. Brezhnev's public statements about peace were quite similar to current statements by Gorbachev.
4. The true value of the CSCE to the Soviet Union may not be the content of the Final Act at all, but the fact that the conference was held at their request, and concluded in an agreement that was general and not legally binding in nature. In other words, the *appearance* of dialogue and agreement may have been more important to the Soviets than the precise content of that agreement.

Finally, it does not appear from the evidence examined in this study that the signature of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the CSCE Final Act represented a fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy from one of confrontation to that of cooperation, security and confidence. Instead, it seems to have signified only a timely change of Soviet vocabulary, an obfuscation of their ambitious program for expanding the U.S.S.R.'s influence in the world. In this case, rather than fostering sentiments of security in the West, the Soviet use of conciliatory language should have caused the West to be even more wary regarding the ultimate intentions of the CPSU.

III. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE IN THE U.S. 1980-84

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the nuclear freeze movements in the United States "through Soviet eyes" with the intent of determining what lessons the Soviets drew from their observations of the phenomenon. It is based on the hypothesis that there may be a correlation between the Soviet peace proposals of the late 1980's and the nuclear freeze phenomenon of the early 1980's. In other words, the "freeze" movements may have provided Soviet decisionmakers with valuable insights about potential opportunities in the "struggle for peace."

The Soviet viewpoint, drawn from the statements and analyses of the period, is the primary focus of the chapter. This chapter is divided into three parts:

1. Chronological background
2. Soviet interpretations
3. Conclusions

This chapter does not provide a systematic analysis of the freeze debate from an American viewpoint.³ Instead, it focuses on the issue from the Soviet perspective.

B. CHRONOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Let us attempt to gain a good footing in fact before we launch out into the uncertain waters of interpretation. The debate over the nuclear freeze was largely contained within the period 1980-84, and was coincident with President Reagan's first term in office. The following timetable of events is not complete, but does offer a framework in which to place the nuclear freeze phenomenon:

1963 - Test Ban Treaty

1964 - Johnson administration proposes freeze on certain strategic systems at Geneva talks

1970 - Senate "Anti-MIRV" resolution sponsored by Senator Brooke passes 73-6

1972 - SALT I signed. (May)

1979 - Carter proposes bilateral freeze on production of nuclear weapons. SALT II signed (June). Soviets invade

³ For an insightful analysis of the nuclear freeze from the U.S. perspective, see Adam Garfinkle's *The Politics of the Nuclear Freeze*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984.

Afghanistan (December 26).

- 1980 - Carter suspends transfers of high technology systems to the U.S.S.R. and asks the Senate to delay SALT II ratification (January). U.S. JCS testify before Congress that Carter's FY '81 budget is insufficient to keep pace with Soviet improvements.
- 1981 - Reagan inauguration. Weinberger named Secretary of Defense (January).
 - President Reagan announces details of strategic defense program of 100 MX's in hardened silos by 1990, full development of B-1 bomber, full development of stealth aircraft (2 October).
 - Reagan comments on possibility of limited nuclear exchange in Europe (16 October).
 - Alexander Haig (Secretary of State) talks of NATO firing "nuclear warning shots" in early stages of European war (4 November).
 - President Reagan offers Soviets "zero option" (18 November).
- 1982 - Large anti-nuclear demonstration in New York (14 June).
 - House defeats first freeze resolution (H.J. Res. 321) 202-204 (5 August).
 - U.S. announces "Dense Pack" MX basing scheme (November).
 - Congress approves record peacetime budget but withholds money for MX production (December).
- 1983 - President Reagan announces SDI plans (March).
 - U.S. Catholic bishops call for nuclear freeze.
 - TV film "The Day After" attracts 100 million viewers (20 Nov).
 - Soviet delegation withdraws from Geneva INF talks (23 Nov).
 - Soviet delegation withdraws from START talks with no date for a resumption of negotiations agreed (14 December).
- 1984 - Ronald Wilson Reagan reelected President (November)

The passage of the 1983 House freeze resolution is generally considered to be the highwater mark of the freeze movement. *U.S. News and World Report* writers Mashek and Hawkins offered this 1986 epitaph for the freeze movement:

While the disarmament cause takes credit for forcing Reagan to discuss arms control with the Soviets and focusing public attention on the risk of nuclear war, even its biggest boosters acknowledge their demoralizing flop in the 1984 election. Despite raising more than \$6 million and maintaining "a huge and constantly growing activity," the antinuclear forces not only failed to defeat the President, they couldn't even make the peace issue a major campaign topic. [Ref. 15: p. 22]

Having briefly established its chronological framework, let us move to the topic of how the Soviets interpreted the American policy debate.

C. SOVIET INTERPRETATIONS

This section treats six areas of Soviet interpretation that are evident from a sampling of their analyses of the nuclear freeze period.

1. Observations on the American political system
2. Psychological pressure
3. Media pressure
4. Pressure from elites
5. Pressure from public opinion
6. Reactionary response of the Administration.

Limited commentary will be offered with regard to the context in which the passages are framed. For the most part, further analysis is deferred for the final chapters of this study.

1. Observations on the American Political System

Soviet observers of the nuclear freeze phenomenon recognized the American political system as being both responsive to pressures exerted on it by its heterogeneous components and accountable to a popular mandate. Considering the opposition party of that day, P.T. Podlesny said:

The pernicious effects of the White House's anti-Soviet policy line, including its effects on the United States' own interests, were also mentioned in a recent report prepared by Democratic congressmen in conjunction with the Democratic Party National Committee: "The Reagan Administration has severely complicated relations with friendly countries and developing states Diplomatic solutions to problems, including the problems of arms control, have been secondary on the administration's list of priorities." [Ref. 16: p. 7]

Concerning the nature of the office of the Presidency, the author had this to say about the then upcoming election and the Soviet preference for a "more realistic" president.

Appeals for more realistic policy in relations with the USSR, for the attenuation of anti-Soviet rhetoric, for interaction by the two countries in the resolution of questions of war and peace and for regular political dialogue on various levels are characteristic of the contenders for the 1984 Democratic Party presidential nomination. All of them have pointedly criticized Reagan's hard anti-Soviet line.

Time will tell if Washington is capable of making a positive response to the mounting worries of millions of Americans about the constant escalation of tension and confrontation in relations with the USSR. A great deal will depend on the balance of power within the United States and on the ability of people with a realistic frame of mind to display enough consistency and persistence to prevent the further deterioration of relations with the USSR and to give them a constructive and stable nature. [Ref. 16: p. 9]

Another writer, A.B. Pankin, offered this political analysis of media coverage of the freeze:

During the 1982 congressional campaign, the freeze attracted attention primarily as a Democratic Party campaign slogan, and this clearly reflected the liberal-centrist media's close ties with the Democrats. If, on the other hand, we analyze news items for 1983, we could conclude that the movement had almost disappeared by this time and that all of its activity was confined primarily to debates in the House of Representatives on the freeze resolution and to the adoption of the Catholic bishops' pastoral message. Both of these events were important, but they were far from the only milestones in the movement's activity. [Ref. 17: p. 24]

We will examine this author's viewpoints in more depth later in this chapter.

A fitting statement to conclude this short sampling of Soviet observations on the American political scene is drawn from an article by Vadim Zagladin, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Speaking in slightly veiled terms, he gives his analysis of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union in terms of the correlation of forces.

But a return to confrontation failed to yield the results hoped for by those who inspired it. First of all, socialism disrupted the attempts to tip the balance of military forces and prevented the military-strategic equilibrium from being upset. Furthermore, the counter-offensive launched by imperialism provoked a broad mobilization of social forces for peace. The struggle against the nuclear missile threat created by the actions of the USA and NATO was joined by forces that previously stayed out of it and even disapproved of it. Certain changes took place in time in the attitude of the ruling circles of the United States allies. They gradually came to be convinced that their goals could not be reached through confrontation, which merely increased the threat of war and posed a greater danger for the existence of entire nations. [Ref. 18: p. 3]

Apparently this "mobilization of social forces for peace" included the U.S. nuclear freeze movements as well as the European antinuclear movements.

2. Psychological Pressure

This area of Soviet interpretation is particularly germane to the overall direction of this study, as it reflects the high degree of attention paid by the Soviets to the psychological impact of nuclear weapons on Americans. One article in *SShI* (USA), with the sobering title "The Nuclear Threat and the Fear Factor" speaks directly to the point of psychological pressure. Of the role that "feelings of fear" could have on the balance of world political forces, the author Zamoshkin said,

On the other hand, the same feelings of fear of nuclear war could stimulate an antimilitarist movement after they reached a certain level of pervasiveness, intensity and urgency. Fear could stimulate a desire for a nuclear freeze, the limitation of

U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms and peaceful agreements with the Soviet Union for these purposes. The fear of a horribly destructive nuclear war could play a sobering role with regard to adventurist power politics. It could also lead to greater caution in the use of threats of force against other countries, especially the USSR. [Ref. 19: p. 5]

Zamoshkin reduced psychology to its barest political core in this passage in which he outlined two paths that the U.S. could have taken with regard to nuclear disarmament. The first is presented as sanity and the second as sickness.

The loss of faith in military invulnerability aroused two kinds of ideological and psychological reactions in the United States.

The first was a more realistic and sober assessment of the change in circumstances -- and it was quite a radical change -- and the realization that the United States was now in the same position that other countries had always been in, including the Soviet Union. The development of political realism in the United States could and did lead to the acknowledgement of the fundamentally objective equality of the United States and the USSR in terms of military security and to a rational search for peaceful accords to secure a mutually guaranteed reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

The second type of reaction, which could be described as "neurotic," was connected with the psychological shock produced by the disintegration of familiar beliefs about U.S. military vulnerability. For an understanding of the tenor of this type of psychological reaction, it is important to recall that it was born in the atmosphere of "cold war," which created a high level of tension in Soviet-American relations. This is also the reason why this new, unfamiliar and painful awareness of the nation's military vulnerability began to be associated with the USSR and its legitimate desire to bring its nuclear weapons up to the level of American weapons. This type of reaction can rightfully be called "neurotic" because it gave rise to morbid and irrational fears, confusion and even hysteria, which were widely used in the 1950's by McCarthyites and later by militant anticommunists and militarists. [Ref. 19: pp. 1-2]

3. Public Opinion

Zamoshkin, in his piece on the factor of "nuclear fear" supports the impression that the Soviets, while they remain committed to Marxist ideology and long-standing Soviet interpretations of reality -- as evidenced by the last citation, are also capable of drawing lessons from analyses of social and political life attitudes in the United States. Consider this passage concerning public opinion sampling.

Up to this point, we have cited data on American public opinion in general to demonstrate the overall effect of the "fear factor" on the American approach to Soviet-American relations. We can assume, however, that various types of connections between the "fear factor" and certain ideological and political attitudes exist in the minds of specific individuals.

Modern computers can aid in revealing the main differences between these types of connections. This is done by means of something called "cluster analysis," during the course of which the computer categorizes respondents according to certain characteristic combinations of views they express on various issues.

An interesting example of the use of public opinion "cluster analysis" can be found in a 1984 study by researchers from the Public Agenda Foundation in collaboration with the Brown University Center for Foreign Policy Development. The results of this study are important to us because the level of fear and anxiety with regard to nuclear war was the main parameter used in the categorization of respondents. The second parameter was the level of anti-Soviet ideological biases and prejudices. The third and fourth parameters recorded different approaches to nuclear arms issues and Soviet-American relations. The computers then classified respondents according to the combinations of their opinions, views and positions on all four parameters. There were four such groups. [Ref. 19: pp. 8-9]

Note that in early 1985 (February), Zamoshkin is interpreting the results of an elaborate computerized study conducted in 1982. A comparable U.S. commentary on Harvey Lauer's "cluster analysis" of attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. and the threat of nuclear weapons appeared in the Fall 1984 issue of *Foreign Affairs* [Ref. 20] only months before Zamoshkin's article. The value of assessing American public opinion can justifiably be read into Grigori Lokshin's 1987 use of the term "common sense" when he says,

Never in history has the problem of war and peace been so crucial for the very existence of humanity as in this nuclear-missile and space age. The question "To be or not to be?" posed by life itself, induces millions in all countries to seriously reappraise today's grim realities. A new political thinking is shaping up. This trend, *based on common sense and a natural desire for self-preservation*, is becoming more and more irreversible in mass consciousness, stimulating a continuous renewal and extension of the social and political basis of the anti-war movement, of the entire world coalition of the forces of reason and peace in the making. (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 21. p. 10]

Here Lokshin blends the antinuclear movement, widespread Western fears of nuclear weapons and the Soviet concept of correlation of forces.

4. Media Pressure

In describing the contradictory position of the "liberal-centrist" media in their attitude toward the "peace movement" A.B. Pankin wrote,

First of all, we should note that one important aspect of the liberal-centrist national media's attitude toward the peace movement is colored by the media's position as a simultaneously political and commercial institution. This is reflected in two ways. On the one hand, the media seek an audience by concentrating (and causing the reader to concentrate) on sensational news items, novelty, melodramatic events, conflicts and the actions of famous people, and this largely determines their choice of subject matter and the accuracy with which they cover these events. At the same time, performing the functions of "an early warning system" and an information agent for the ruling class as a whole, the media must display a certain degree of objectivity or they will be simply unable to satisfy the information needs of the U.S. political elite. [Ref. 17: p. 17]

His phrases "early warning system" and "the information needs of the U.S. political elite" are interesting. They show the calculating nature of his analysis.

A second excerpt from Pankin's article contains a phrase which may represent a prototype of Gorbachev's "new political thinking" formulation:

Let us summarize our conclusions. The peace movement and its major concerns are covered by the media from the vantage point of the liberal-centrist establishment. The strategic aims of this consist in imposing establishment ideas on the movement, neutralizing its more consistent elements and using its power to increase possible opposition to the Reagan Administration's extremist line in the upper echelons of government. *Here there is not even a trace of the new line of reasoning for the nuclear age*, the line advised by Albert Einstein, or of the humanitarian thinking so energetically promoted by peace activists of our day, but there are attempts to update the old theories of "intimidation" and "deterrence" and to make them seem less dangerous to the public. There is also an obvious desire to de-escalate and stabilize the arms race; and this desire is so much more realistic than the Reagan Administration's wish for military superiority to the USSR. (Emphasis added) [Ref. 17: p. 25]

5. Pressure from Elites

Various Soviet analysts assessed the impact of elites on U.S. policy during the freeze period. P.T. Podlesnyy termed one such group "the American foreign policy elite:"

Members of the American foreign policy elite are also somewhat disturbed by the fact that now that the United States has begun the deployment of the new American missiles in Western Europe against the wishes of the West European public, it might have to pay a disproportionate political price for this in the future due to the increase in anti-American feelings on the continent as a result of West European worries about the possible subversion of detente and about the new round of the nuclear arms race. [Ref. 16: p. 8]

Continuing on the same theme, Podlesnyy said:

The results of White House foreign policy activity have become the subject of heated debates in the U.S. political and academic communities, the members of which have expressed concern and anxiety over the tendency of Washington's emphasis on force in relations with the USSR to increase the danger of nuclear war, destabilize international relations, create tension in virtually all spheres of American-Soviet relations and erect a high wall of suspicion in these relations. It is indicative that Washington's anti-Soviet policy line is even being criticized by authoritative members of the American foreign policy establishment who were directly involved in the engineering and conduct of U.S. policy toward the USSR for many years and who learned from their own experience that it is futile to deal with the USSR from a position of strength and diktat. [Ref. 16: p. 6]

6. Reactionary Response of the Administration

As it is used here, the term *reactionary* may be defined as meaning "resisting the 'progressive' proposals of the CPSU for disarmament according to its designs." This is the content of the following polemical response to the Administration's "reactionary" policies during the period in which the nuclear freeze movements were prominent and successful in gaining public attention.

Washington also hopes to weaken the peace movement, turn it against the USSR, prevent the further spread of the discussions begun in the ruling class on matters of American-Soviet relations, and discredit the politicians who criticize Washington's power politics and advocate the restoration of constructive relations with the USSR. Finally, the hard anti-Soviet rhetoric reflects the rabid, pathological anticommunism of Ronald Reagan and some of his closest advisors. The anti-Soviet campaigns are consistent with their ideological beliefs and political outlook, and they conceal the administration's lack of a more thoroughly considered and balanced policy toward the USSR. [Ref. 16: p. 4]

Interestingly, in the same article Podlesnyy offers a concise Soviet analysis of his hypothesized U.S. grand strategy of the day by saying,

It is on these premises that the chief aim of Reagan's policy rests: the comprehensive buildup of U.S. and NATO military strength, the maximum restriction of trade and scientific contacts and the more energetic use of ideological leverage to exert stronger pressure on the USSR in order to disrupt plans for Soviet peaceful construction, undermine the bases of socialism, weaken the Soviet Union's foreign political positions and reduce the sphere of its influence in the world. The administration's approach is devoid of any kind of positive program to correct the abnormal state of affairs in American-Soviet relations and is permeated with the hope that the continued exertion of pressure on the USSR could force it to make some kind of additional concessions of unilateral benefit to the United States and the West in general. [Ref. 16: pp. 1-2]

D. CONCLUSIONS

This sampling of a few Soviet commentaries on the nuclear freeze movement in the U.S. and on American political life in general yields several impressions:

1. They reflect a will to base Soviet policies on careful and sober assessments with regard to American political and societal values.
2. The sentiments they express show a high degree of continuity with peace initiatives proposed by the current Soviet leadership.
3. The potential propaganda value of the fear of nuclear weapons among Americans was noted by Soviet analysts.
4. Soviet experts are capable of discerning opportunities to capitalize on trends internal to the American political and value systems in framing Soviet strategies of influence.

IV. CONTEMPORARY SOVIET PEACE PROGRAMS

A. INTRODUCTION

This study began by considering the opening and closing paragraphs of General Secretary Gorbachev's "direct appeal to the peoples of the USSR, America, and the world," in his book *Perestroika*. This chapter deals with the content of Gorbachev's peace program, as outlined in this book and in other statements. Of the many themes of *Perestroika*, the central one for Western listeners seems to be that it represents new political thinking for a world in peril of destruction. It is an appeal for nuclear disarmament. Gorbachev claims to have an altogether new approach, which he describes as the only hope for mankind. He appeals to Western publics to align themselves with him and to bring pressure on their governments to hasten the advent of a nuclear-free world.

Speaking in the context of capitalizing on the deep fear of nuclear weapons among American publics and of mobilizing them politically toward antinuclear activism, Yu. A. Zamoshkin wrote in 1985:

In this context, the political and propaganda significance of Soviet proposals and peace initiatives is indisputable, but unfortunately the American public is usually not sufficiently informed about these. [Ref. 19: p. 14]

This quote may very well express the intent of General Secretary Gorbachev in broadly communicating his program for peace directly to the American public. There appears to be a certain irony in Zamoshkin's words, in that if Westerners were truly well-informed, they would receive these proposals with great caution and skepticism.

Three elements of background information regarding contemporary Soviet peace programs must be discussed before we turn to the major themes of Gorbachev's "new political thinking:"

1. Mechanisms for peace
2. Concepts of peace
3. The Brezhnev peace program of the 1970's

This chapter concludes with several observations on the long-term implications of the current appeals for peace, cooperation and disarmament originating from the leadership of the CPSU.

B. MECHANISMS FOR PEACE

A description of Soviet institutions that are charged with "campaigning for peace" is necessary for Westerners to grasp the full context of current peace initiatives. This treatment is brief, because it is intended as background to the main focus of this chapter.

The asymmetries between the Soviet and U.S. systems of government are highlighted in the areas of peace programming, propaganda, and the use of the media. Western societies such as the United States have few, if any, parallels to institutionalized Soviet peace programming. It is precisely because of these asymmetries that Westerners need to protect themselves from "mirror imaging" and the projection of Western values and concepts on the Soviets.

Four aspects of Soviet peace "mechanisms" are discussed here.

1. Prominent organizations involved in peace programming
2. Background on the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (ID)
3. Resources Available To Peace Institutions
4. Role of the press and media in peace programming

1. Organizations Involved in Peace Programming

The U.S. State Department has identified two organizations that are engaged in coordinating propaganda and active measures to affect public opinion. The first organization is the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The ID is currently headed by long time ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy Dobrynin. The ID maintains ties with over 70 pro-Soviet Communist parties, with numerous front organizations, and with national liberation movements. The second organization involved in "peace programming" active measures is Service "A" (Disinformation and Active Measures) of the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) of the KGB. This organization is charged with coordinating and planning the dissemination of "false and provocative information" designed to influence or deceive both governments and publics outside the Soviet Bloc. [Ref. 2: p. 219]

The Politburo of the CPSU establishes policy for these organizations and coordinates their activities. The research institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences involved with international relations operate under the International Department [Ref. 2: p. 218]. The Academy established the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada in 1968. The institute's chief, Georgi Arbatov, in a book written with Willem Oltmans, had this to say about its functions,

[We study] American and Canadian economic problems, domestic and social problems, political parties, the electoral processes, and so forth. We also study American military policy, not the U.S. military establishment as such, but the impact of military expenditures and programs, doctrines and postures on American foreign policy, including, of course, American-Soviet relations. We also study problems of arms control. A special department does research on problems of U.S. foreign policy in various regions, such as Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, and in developing nations. *There is a department that studies American public opinion, ideology, and culture.* (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 22: p. 21]

This book, published in 1981, along with another book by Arbatov written nearly a decade earlier, will be discussed in the section on concepts of peace.

Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy of the ID for the last ten years, gave insight to the overall purpose of these peace programming organizations when he wrote the following in *International Affairs* in 1985.

The anti-imperialist front in the world is extremely wide and its activity has assumed unprecedented scope. Therefore, to correctly assess the state and perspectives of world politics it is imperative to take into account the balance of forces between imperialism and all its opponents.

And finally, the fourth parameter, which in our view has acquired particular significance in the 1970's and 1980's when the antiwar movement has reached such an unprecedented scope, is the balance of forces between the opponents of war *and the narrow but highly influential circles of capitalist society who favor a military way of resolving world contradictions "through strength."* (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 18: p. 70]

The CPSU Central Committee has established the organizations described earlier in order to bring political pressure on Western governments through the management of information and perceptions. In the italicized phrase above, Zagladin continues the Soviet practice of attributing the causes of conflict with the West to "capitalist society," and even more specifically to "narrow but highly influential circles," which one may reckon to be synonymous with the "military-industrial complex," since this is the formula often used in Soviet writings.

2. Background of the International Department

The organizational heritage of the International Department gives a useful insight to its functions and likely *raison d'être*:

Between the two World Wars, CPSU relations with other communist parties and early active measures-type operations were handled by the Third International, or Comintern, which was disbanded by Stalin as a gesture of good will to the allies in 1943. The ID was set up sometime afterward as successor to the Comintern. (The ID shared the "successor" label with the Cominform during the latter organization's short life.) Until 1957, the ID handled relations with both ruling and nonruling communist parties, but the 1956 crises in Hungary and Poland led the Soviets to

overhaul their relations with ruling communist parties. This responsibility was taken from the ID and given to a new Department for Liaison with the Communist and Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries. [Ref. 23: p. 3]

The above being the organizational heritage of the ID, Arbatov's benign and purely academic description of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada's functions does not seem likely.

3. Resources Available to Peace Institutions

Using funding as an indicator of the Soviet government's commitment to these organizations and their functions, the following estimates have been made:

- \$63 million - annual cost of propaganda and political activities of major front organizations operating outside the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 24: p. 44]
- \$ 4 billion - annual cost of total Soviet propaganda effort. [Ref 2: p. 215]

4. Role of the Press and Media in Peace Programming

A fourth asymmetrical factor in the "struggle for peace" is the use of the communication media in the Soviet Union.

Speaking in the context of democratization of the Soviet system as meaning that citizens are now permitted to comment on the effectiveness of government efforts without fear of reprisal, Gorbachev has provided an interesting insight regarding the role of the Soviet press in his plan for restructuring within the Soviet Union.⁴

The press must become even more effective. It should not leave in peace loafers, profit-seekers, time-servers, suppressors of criticism, and demagogues; it should more actively help those who are selflessly working for perestroika. A lot here depends on the local Party committees. *If the Party committee reorganizes its work, the press does so to.*

I want to emphasize that the press should unite and mobilize people rather than disuniting them and generating offence and a lack of confidence. Renewal of society also means striving to assert the dignity of man, his elevation and his honor. Criticism can be an effective instrument of perestroika only if it is based on absolute truth and scrupulous concern for justice.

To uphold the fundamental values of socialism is a tradition of our press. (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 1: pp. 78-9]

Turning to the Soviet view of the usefulness of the world press as a vehicle for expressing their official viewpoints, Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB disinformation

⁴ Compare the political bias contained in this statement regarding the Soviet press with that contained in A.B. Pankin's earlier statement regarding the "liberal centrist" media in the U.S. found on page 22 of this study.

officer in Japan, offered these insights (after describing two groups used in Soviet disinformation activities -- KGB foreign agents and "agents of influence"):

And Levchenko identified a third group among journalists, that is unwitting agents of influence -- foreign correspondents in Moscow and other Communist capitals, for example, who become dependent on translators and other support personnel furnished by the Soviet Government. These, Mr. Levchenko said, are 100-percent KGB agents. Some of these correspondents, hard up for information, may, moreover, be set up with "confidential sources" that are actually channels for KGB information or disinformation. He gave two examples of inspired stories that gained wide currency by this route. One concerned the pro-Western proclivities of Andropov, who was said to like jazz, wear sneakers, and the like. Another was the notion that the Politburo is divided into hawks and doves, a division which, Levchenko maintained, is out of the question. Something similar is happening now, he said, as Soviet "sources" put it out that Gorbachev is preoccupied with reforming the domestic economy and thus too busy to conduct a vigorous foreign policy. [Ref. 2: pp. 27-8]

In both the domestic and international dimensions, the Soviet use of the press as an instrument of the party in forwarding its policy programs reflects a powerful contrast with the West. With these four facets of Soviet "peace" institutions in mind, let us turn to "peaceful" concepts that have been transmitted to the West by these institutions.

C. CONCEPTS OF PEACE

Three recurrent concepts are examined here as necessary aids in understanding recent and contemporary Soviet peace programming:

1. Soviet usage of the word *peace*
2. Correlation of forces
3. Peaceful coexistence

1. Soviet Usage of the Word Peace

The operative Soviet definition of *peace* is linked with the universal victory of socialism today, just as it was when Lenin penned his line "disarmament is the ideal of socialism" referred to in the introduction to this study. Deputy Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, Dmitri Volkoganov, used the word in this sense when he said,

...the real struggle for peace is not a kind of abstract form of pacifist condemnation of war "in general." It is above all the exposure of the true culprits of the terrible danger threatening mankind. It is a struggle against those who are blocking the peace initiatives of socialist countries and who are *unwilling to abandon the criminal idea of solving the main contradiction of the age by nuclear force.* (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 23: p. 16]

This concept of peace is quite different from that common in the West. Also noteworthy in this statement is Volkoganov's slanderous insinuation that there are people in Western governments who want to conduct a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet expatriate dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, speaking of the early days of the Soviet period, elucidated the communists' concept of peace when he wrote:

Once they recognized the power of "peace" as a weapon, the Communists have never let go of it. In this respect, it must be admitted, Soviet politics have invariably been most "peaceful." We must at the same time bear in mind that according to Communist dogma, wars are the "inevitable consequence of the clash of imperialist interests under capitalism," and therefore they will continue to be inevitable as long as capitalism exists. The only way to save humanity from the evil of wars, then, is to "liberate" it from the "chains of capitalism." Accordingly, there is a very precise distinction to be made between "just wars" and "unjust wars." "Just wars" are those fought "in the interests of the proletariat." It is perfectly simple and perfectly clear: just wars are absolutely justifiable because they lead to the creation of a world in which there will be no wars, forevermore. Proletarians are all brothers, are they not? So, once the world is rid of capitalists, imperialists, and various other class enemies, why should those who are left fight one another? [Ref. 25: p. 37]

2. Correlation of Forces

The Soviet concept of the correlation of forces involves a holistic assessment of all instruments of influence available to them. Vadim Zagladin's evaluation of the role played by peace groups in the West in opposing imperialism and its policies cited earlier is a good example of the concept applied to international relations.⁵ A.B. Pankin, writing in 1984, in the journal *SShA* (U.S.A), concluded an article on the media and the peace movement by saying,

Furthermore, the strength of the American peace movement is compounded by the fact that it is acting in unison with all other world forces toward the preservation of human civilization. [Ref. 17: p. 26]

From these few examples we can see that the Soviets consider the correlation of peace forces an important facet of their peace program and their effort to bring into being a world order more to their liking than that currently in place.

3. Peaceful Coexistence

The third and final background concept of peace in this section is that of peaceful coexistence. From a purely Western point of view, this formulation appears to mean "let bygones be bygones," or a truce between warring factions. This is not the sense that has prevailed in Soviet usage. In his 1973 book, *The War of Ideas in Con-*

⁵ See page 27 of this study.

temporary International Relations, Georgi Arbatov implied that the Soviet focus is on the ultimate victory of socialism, and not on a world free of armed confrontation when he wrote:

Peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, is the only possible alternative not only to a world war but also to the cold war. Its objective is to create firm guarantees of peace, improve the entire system of international relations, and consolidate in these relations genuinely democratic principles conforming to the interests of the peoples and to the requirements of the nuclear age. Peaceful coexistence implies more than that no state of war exists at the given time. It calls for a determined struggle against imperialist aggression, for the eradication of all the flashpoints of another world war, for the settlement of all tension-building disputes and conflicts by negotiation and in the interests of the peoples, for the cessation of the arms race, for the creation of an effective international system of preventing aggression, and for the promotion of economic, scientific, technological, and cultural relations between countries. [Ref. 26: p. 273]

Although it was not stated directly here, Western audiences should remain aware that according to Soviet political theory, only the CPSU knows what is "in the interest of the peoples," since it alone is the true vanguard of the proletariat. Arbatov explained that peaceful coexistence was not possible in the area of ideology, by using the special logic of Marxist class struggle:

The reasons why the Communist parties, while proclaiming the normalisation of international relations as one of their aims, consider the ideological struggle inevitable and necessary are quite evident.

The essence of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence is that it envisages the parallel existence not simply of different states, but of states belonging to opposite social systems. *Hence the relations between these systems cannot be confined to conventional diplomatic relations, important as they are in themselves.* The existence of the two systems has another aspect, namely, that each of them embodies the rule of a class -- the capitalist class in one case, and the working class in the other, and that an uncompromising struggle, forming the basic content of our epoch, rages between them. The struggle between these classes began long before the first Communist Party came into being, and it was not called to life by Marx.

As the Marxists-Leninists see it, this struggle can only end with the triumph of communism. Socialism's victory in the countries that today form the world socialist system is an important stage on the road to this objective. But this success does not and cannot mean the termination of the class struggle. Between the working class and the bourgeoisie the struggle goes on and will continue in individual countries and on the world scene, which, in addition to the clash of political and economic interests, witnesses a historic duel between the two social systems. This duel, which is unfolding in the economic, political and ideological spheres, began more than half a century ago and it will not end until the more progressive system is completely victorious. Such is the incontrovertible law of social development, a law dictated not by somebody's evil will but by objective conditions. (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 26: p. 274]

1973 might seem a long time ago in the perspective of examining contemporary Soviet designs, were it not that the Soviets are generally recognized (by experts in the West) to have a very long-term orientation in international relations. In this regard it is important to note that Arbatov is in the same position today under Gorbachev as he was in 1973 under Brezhnev and performs the same function as an ideological fighter for "peace" in a struggle that "cannot be confined to conventional diplomatic relations." Continuing on the same theme of peaceful coexistence, the same speaker on the same subject uses the same term, with a less threatening connotation, in this excerpt from his 1981 book.

The essence of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence is that it envisages the parallel and peaceful existence of states belonging to opposite social systems. These systems differ in their economic structures, in the character of their social relations, their values, and their ideals. In today's world the influence of ideologies can't be confined only to those countries where they predominate. Ideologies constantly clash both on the global scale and within many countries. This fact of life was not invented by us and it cannot be ignored. To Americans, proud of their pluralist tradition, this should be perfectly clear. But once an ideological struggle is turned into a crusade or a witch hunt, it immediately acquires the potential to arouse and aggravate conflicts. History has presented us with many examples of this kind. Even more numerous are the cases when ideology and ideas in general were only a coverup for actions motivated by other things, like greed, lust for power, and so on. One example could be the messianic pretensions of the Spanish conquistadors.

Ideology and propaganda may also be used as instruments of a certain policy, in particular a policy of subversion and destabilization of other societies. It's true both for times of war and times of peace. The Cold War was a good example, with its peculiar type of ideological struggle succinctly called "psychological warfare." Propaganda of this sort is in our view incompatible with detente and peaceful coexistence. It can only damage relations between countries. [Ref. 22: p. 142]

What happened in the eight years between these two statements? This writer's impression is that the denotative meaning of *peaceful coexistence* did not change, but the political mood of the day in 1981 called for less strident language when addressing Western audiences than did the mood of 1973. This trend of molification of rhetoric from Soviet spokesmen has apparently continued in the seven years since Arbatov's last quote, and is reflected in the tenor of contemporary Soviet statements.

This is not a linguistic study, and to expand it too far in that direction could endanger the objective of extracting meaning from current Soviet peace proposals. Three conclusions, however, can be drawn from this short examination of key concepts expressed in the Soviet struggle for peace:

1. The Soviets apparently see a greater value in speaking in conciliatory terms when addressing "imperialist" audiences, since direct speech could evoke resistance that would retard the achievement of long-term goals.
2. These statements are carefully formulated with a *double entendre* that is on one side ideologically justifiable to the home audience, and on the other side palatable to Western hearers.
3. In a long-term perspective, the Soviet formulations have become less stridently ideological and more acceptable to Western publics.

The comments of a participant at a U.S. State Department conference on Soviet propaganda and disinformation are related to the observations outlined above.⁶

This speaker raised a separate question, namely, the role of Soviet propaganda in strategic deception -- in deceiving adversaries about what the fundamental nature of the Soviet system is, and therefore, about what the fundamental strategic intentions of the Soviet regime are. The number one propaganda disinformation theme, he thought, is to convince people that the Soviets are not Communists any more. If they are Communists in the service of a revolutionary, totalitarian, ideological power, they must necessarily have unlimited objectives in the world. But if they are not (so this deception postulates), their objectives are not necessarily unlimited, and all sorts of things -- different forms of accommodations and compromise -- become possible. [Ref. 2: p. 29]

To conclude, the Soviets, in their use of the phrases *peace* and *peaceful coexistence* remain consistent with their long-standing goal of the worldwide victory of socialism. Their concept of the *correlation of forces* involves a struggle for "peace" on Soviet terms in which language plays a most influential role. The goal has not changed over the years. The flavor of the language has, however, been adapted so as not to arouse the West's suspicions.

D. THE BREZHNEV PEACE PROGRAM OF THE 1970'S

This section will briefly highlight two important areas of background to current peace proposals offered by the Soviets. They are drawn from the Brezhnev era and pre-date Mikhail Gorbachev's "new political thinking" on the subject. These two items are:

1. Negotiations as peace tactics
2. The appeal to U.S. interest groups

⁶ Unfortunately Reference 2 omitted the identity of this participant in the discussion .

1. Negotiations as Peace Tactics

We in the West are not privy to the policy designs originated in the CPSU Politburo that guided Brezhnev's foreign policy in the 1970's, just as we can only speculate on the motivations behind the designs of the current leadership. One observable characteristic of the Brezhnev policy, however, was the use of negotiations and other international fora as means of influencing Western policy. In analyzing this period, Stanley Kober has said,

In 1971, at the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev launched his "peace offensive." The policy of the CPSU, he declared, was "to conclude treaties putting a ban on nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons We stand for the nuclear disarmament of all states in possession of nuclear weapons." This attempt to resolve fundamental problems of East-West relations through negotiations was the purported basis of detente, which Brezhnev defined as "a readiness to resolve differences and arguments not by force, not by threats or saber-rattling, but by peaceful means, at the conference table. Detente is a certain trust and ability to take into account the legitimate interests of one another." [Ref. 2: p. 189]

Two points of interest to this study emerge from this passage. The first is that as early as 1971 the CPSU had spoken out for total nuclear disarmament. In this regard, more recent Soviet statements such as Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 proposal can be seen as continuations of long-term Soviet policy. The second point is a question. Given the inimical natures of the "socialist" and "imperialist" systems according to the ideology of the CPSU, do the Soviets believe that capitalists and imperialists have *legitimate interests*?

This use of the "conference table" as a means of forwarding Soviet long-term strategic plans is an important legacy of the Brezhnev period. Earlier in this study we examined the connection between the CSCE, the 1977 "Brezhnev" constitution, and the 1985 revision of the Party Program of the CPSU. The meaning of the CSCE remains poorly understood in the West. The question of whether it should be seen as an "anti-Yalta" for the West which may ultimately redress grievances resulting from the earlier pact, or be seen as a "super-Yalta" for the Soviets with regard to hegemony in Europe is still an open question. It is evident, however, that positive allusions to the "Helsinki solution" appear frequently in Gorbachev era Soviet writings. The current General Secretary, speaking in a report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenary in April, 1985, said,

The Politburo believes that the international documents of the detente period, including the Helsinki Final Act, have lost none of their importance. They exemplify

the way international relations can be built if nations are guided by the principles of equality and equal security, by the realities in the world, if they do not seek any advantages, but mutually acceptable decisions and agreements. In connection with the tenth anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it would be useful if, on behalf of the countries which signed the Final Act, the will to overcome dangerous tension and develop peaceful cooperation and constructive foundations in international life were once again to be expressed in Helsinki. [Ref. 27: pp. 86-7]

Thus, a month after being selected as the representative of the collective leadership, Gorbachev apparently was saying, "Let's keep a good thing going." In addition to the benefit the Soviets accrued from the Helsinki Final Act regarding the tacit legitimization of their political and territorial gains made in Europe after World War Two, at least in the eyes of some observers,⁷ they apparently see special value in the type of negotiations that yielded the Final Act. The CSCE may have given them a "bully pulpit" from which to demonstrate to both individual nations and alliances alike, the superpower status that parity with the U.S. had bought them. Some insight to this question might be gained through Gennadi Stakh's November 1987 statement in *International Affairs* (Moscow) that,

The toughest line of the USA is that disarmament problems should be discussed only between blocs ("tête-à-tête" between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries), that a large number of European states -- neutral and non-aligned ("n+n" group) should be denied a say in their solution.

Attempts to deprive these countries, some of which (Yugoslavia and Sweden) have considerable conventional potential, of the right to discuss the issues affecting their security and the security of Europe as a whole challenge fundamental principles, notably the principle of the equality of states, enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. [Ref. 28: p. 109]

Perhaps the CSCE model for negotiations embodied a synergy of two forces for the Soviets in that first, it offered its strategic competitors in the NATO alliance, a hope for reconciliation and peace in the conventional Western sense, and second, an opportunity to appeal to the individual interests of participating states. In any case, the Soviets repeatedly invoke the CSCE as a desirable model for future negotiations. To summarize, since Brezhnev, negotiations seem especially desirable to the Soviets, and multinational negotiations along the lines of the CSCE are preferred for certain purposes.

⁷ The United States does not recognize the Soviet annexation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

2. Appeal to Western Interest Groups

The Soviets seem to have drawn an important conclusion from watching the American political system react to the pressures exerted on it during the Vietnam War. Dutch analyst J.A. Emerson Vermaat brings together evidence of this from several Soviet spokesmen.

The success of the anti-Vietnam war movement, when, according to one Soviet observer, "the demand to end the aggression became the universal demand of various political movements, including those in the United States," demonstrated to Moscow the efficacy of public opinion in the West. Plans to create a peace movement patterned after the anti-Vietnam war movement were worked out during and after the World Conference of Peace Forces in Moscow in 1973. The Soviets felt that the "correlation of forces" had never been so favorable to them. Leonid Brezhnev declared:

"One can say with confidence that the present changes in the world situation are largely the result of the activities of public forces, of the hitherto unparalleled activity of the people, who are displaying sharp intolerance of arbitrary rule and aggression and an unbending will for peace."

According to Vitaliy Korionov, political commentator of *Pravda*, "favorable conditions enabling the peace-loving democratic forces to launch a decisive offensive against the imperialist forces of war and aggression had arisen by the beginning of the seventies." It is evident that the Soviet side had become well aware of the impact movements for disarmament could make on the decision-making process in the West. [Ref. 24: pp. 46-7]

The nuclear freeze debate in the U.S. has already been discussed at some length in this study. The degree of political pressure generated by that movement could not have been lost on the Soviets. Perhaps they have synthesized their findings regarding the protest movement of the Vietnam era and the antinuclear movement of the early 1980's and have accordingly rephrased their peaceable appeals. Something has changed in Soviet rhetoric in the last few years. That much is sure. The comradely tones of *Perestroika* have quite a different ring than these three paragraphs taken from a speech Gorbachev delivered in 1983, two years before his selection as General Secretary.

The powerful upsurge in the antiwar movement, which has embraced the entire globe, has become the sign of the times. Lenin's words serve as a warning: "The war is terrible; it has hit the vast mass of the people the hardest of all" The slogan "No to war!" is spreading throughout Europe, and is echoed in the United States and heard the world over.

The antiwar movement has become an influential factor in international life. The ruling circles in the United States and the other NATO countries have to take into account public protests against the arms race and against the deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe. These protests reflect a new level of social consciousness and activity of the masses.

Communists and social Democrats, Christians and Liberals, trade union, religious, women's, youth, and other organizations approach the struggle for peace from largely different political and ideological positions. But they have a common

goal -- *to prevent the catastrophe which the warmongers are preparing for mankind.* The conviction that this goal can be attained is growing ever stronger. War can and must be prevented. (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 27: pp. 26-7]

Note the recurrence of the theme of Western responsibility for political and military tensions -- that the "warmongers" are preparing a catastrophe for mankind. It is worthy of note that Gorbachev spoke the words quoted above at a meeting in Moscow to mark the 113th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

E. GORBACHEV AS A PEACE PROGRAMMER -- THEMES FROM PERESTROIKA

This section examines key themes that emerge from General Secretary Gorbachev's contemporary appeals. The main source of these appeals is his book, *Perestroika*. This study organizes nineteen key themes into six groupings. These groupings are:

1. Communalism
2. The nature of communism
3. New political thinking
4. Nuclear fear
5. Old political thinking
6. Strength and resolve of the U.S.S.R.

These groupings are presented in the order listed, and observations drawn from individual themes are related to these questions:

- How does Gorbachev's appeal relate to Soviet long-term military and political strategy?
- What is his intended message for the people of the U.S. and the Western alliance?
- Are there discernible messages that lie below the surface of his words?

Short citations from the book are provided as examples of these themes. This method offers the reader a useful distillation of Gorbachev's appeal to the publics of the West.

1. Communalism

This grouping of themes stresses that this is a small planet, and that several factors (including environmental pollution, the threat of nuclear devastation and Third World under-development and poverty) have made this modern age different from all previous ages. Within this grouping there are three discrete themes. The first may be stated as "*Our problem is your problem.*" Gorbachev's "common European home" metaphor is perhaps the best example of this theme.

This metaphor came to my mind in one of my discussions. Although seemingly I voiced it in passing, in my mind I had been looking for such a formula for a long time. It did not come to me all of a sudden but after much thought and, notably, after meetings with many European leaders.

Having conditioned myself for a new political outlook, I could no longer accept in the old way the multi-colored, patchwork-quilt-like political map of Europe. The continent has known more than its share of wars and tears. It has had enough. Scanning the panorama of this long-suffering land and pondering on the common roots of such a multi-form but essentially common European civilization, I felt with growing acuteness the artificiality and temporariness of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation and the archaic nature of the "iron curtain." That was probably how the idea of a common European home came to my mind, and at the right moment this expression sprang from my tongue by itself. [Ref. 1: p. 194]

This passage seems surreal in that it is detached from the history of the post-1945 period as it is commonly understood in the West. In Gorbachev's opening message to the reader cited earlier, he says that, "... the purpose of this book is to talk without intermediaries to the citizens of the whole world about things that, without exception concern us all." [Ref. 1: p. 9] Perhaps communality will be the future face of communism.

The second theme of expressing communality might be called "*spaceship earth*." In an obvious analogy drawn between Noah's flood and the threat of nuclear war, Gorbachev says:

For all the contradictions of the present-day world, for all the diversity of social and political systems in it, and for all the different choices made by the nations in different times, this world is nevertheless one whole. We are all passengers aboard one ship, the Earth, and we must not allow it to be wrecked. There will be no second Noah's ark. [Ref. 1: p. 12]

A second motivation for globalism is offered in environmental terms when he says,

Another no less obvious reality of our time is the emergence and aggravation of the so-called global issues which have also become vital to the destinies of civilization. I mean nature conservation, the critical condition of the environment, of the air basin and the oceans, and of our planet's traditional resources which have turned out not to be limitless. I mean old and new awful diseases and mankind's common concern: how are we to put an end to starvation and poverty in vast areas of the Earth? I mean the intelligent joint work in exploring outer space and the world ocean and the use of the knowledge obtained to the benefit of humanity. [Ref. 1: p. 137]

By alluding to widespread fears of extermination and disease, to concern for the environment and to love for our fellow man, General Secretary Gorbachev implores us to think in global terms. This last quotation touches on the third and final theme in this grouping, that of "*Third World development*." Many references to the Third World in the book are accompanied by familiar Soviet language regarding the theoretical process of

transition from decolonialization to maturity as a socialist state. The following appeal for America to shift its resources from defense spending to foreign aid does not mention that process.:

We call on the US Administration to join hands with us in searching for solutions to the Third World's problems. There are other ways besides compulsion to do it. What we propose is quite realistic. The United States should find a way to divert its might, its capital -- everything that is now being squandered for military purposes -- to meeting different needs, to solving the modern world's economic and social problems. I'm positive that this is quite possible. More than that, the United States could enlist the assistance of other Western countries. And I repeat that all the while it would stand only to gain. [Ref. 1: p. 189]

As can be seen in these examples, Gorbachev is offering a multi-faceted appeal for America and the West to recognize that we have common problems, and that our destinies are unalterably linked.

2. The Nature of Communism

The composite message of this grouping is that the West has misunderstood the nature of communism and has misinterpreted the history of the Soviet rule in Russia. This message is essentially one of historical revision. Individual themes within this category will be treated chronologically. The first theme states that, "*The firebrand image of Lenin is incorrect.*" At one point in the book, Gorbachev takes aim at President Reagan and his view of Lenin's legacy and says,

As for the mysterious White House book of quotations to which the West refers, deliberating about Lenin's "doctrine" of imposing communism throughout the world and plans for subduing the whole of Europe, I must say that no such doctrine was ever entertained by Marx, Lenin or any of the Soviet leaders. The so-called "quotations" sometimes used by high-ranking speakers are the fruit of crude falsification or at best ignorance. [Ref. 1: p. 150]

Gorbachev includes a eulogy of Lenin earlier in the book, in a section entitled "Turning to Lenin, an Ideological Source of Perestroika." This apotheosis of Lenin reads,

The works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity. His very image is an undying example of lofty moral strength, all-round spiritual culture and selfless devotion to the cause of the people and to socialism. Lenin lives on in the minds and hearts of millions of people. Breaking down all the barriers erected by scholastics and dogmatists, an interest in Lenin's legacy and a thirst to know him more extensively in the original grew as negative phenomena in society accumulated. [Ref. 1: p. 26]

This passage blends the earlier theme of attributing humanitarianism to Lenin and the second theme of this grouping, that of Gorbachev's program for restructuring as a "re-

turn to Leninism." It is not an overstatement to say that a cult of Lenin exists in the Soviet Union, and that the high Soviet leaders are the most ardent devotees of that cult. Gorbachev claims ideological orthodoxy for his reformation as he describes the genesis of his "new political thinking" as a product of meditation on Lenin's visionary thought.

It can be said that we have conceived the new mentality through suffering. And we draw inspiration from Lenin. Turning to him, and "reading" his works each time in a new way, one is struck by his ability to get at the root of things, to see the most intricate dialectics of world processes. Being the leader of the party of the proletariat, and theoretically and politically substantiating the latter's revolutionary tasks, Lenin could see further, he could go beyond their class-imposed limits. More than once he spoke about the priority of interests common to all humanity over class interests. It is only now that we have come to comprehend the entire depth and significance of these ideas. It is they that are feeding our philosophy of international relations, and the new way of thinking. [Ref. 1: p. 145]

The next two themes involve the 20th and 27th Congresses of the CPSU. In his interpretation of Khrushchev's speech at the landmark 20th Party Congress, Gorbachev outlines its major accomplishments as: originating the modern usage of the concept of peaceful coexistence, condemning the personality cult of Stalin and attempting economic reform [Ref. 1: p. 45]. Gorbachev apparently drew one important lesson from Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964, in that the reforming First Secretary of that day did not have the complete support of the CPSU apparatus, notably the Central Committee Plenum. Gorbachev implies that he will not have this problem, as he repeatedly states that the restructuring program has been worked out thoroughly with this body [Ref. 1: pp. 60-74]. Concerning the linguistic revision of CPSU documents by the 27th Congress, Gorbachev says,

At the 27th CPSU Congress we clearly "divorced" the revolution and war themes, excluding from the new edition of the Party Program the following two phrases: "Should the imperialist aggressors nevertheless venture to start a new world war, the peoples will no longer tolerate a system which drags them into devastating wars. They will sweep imperialism away and bury it." This provision admitting, in theory, the possibility of a new world war was removed as not corresponding to the realities of the nuclear era. [Ref. 1: p. 148]

Gorbachev implies here that the bellicosity of the CPSU has diminished due to a sober assessment of the risks of nuclear war. Does a careful choice of words that are less indicative of the USSR's readiness for combat make war less likely? Additionally, the line of reasoning used in this passage raises a theoretical question: if a new world war is impossible thanks to nuclear weapons, why does he wish to get rid of nuclear weapons? Is it possible that the Soviets believe that nuclear weapons tend to stabilize the political

status quo, in addition to making a world war highly unlikely, and that the Soviet interest in political change causes them to favor policies of denuclearization? In any case, Gorbachev offers the 27th Party Congress, *his* landmark congress, as further evidence of a diminishing Soviet threat to Western security.

The fifth theme is a catch-all for miscellaneous revisions of the history of East-West relations. These revisions, for lack of a more diplomatic term, are labeled "*disinformation*". They include claims that:

1. The ruling national communist parties and the West were to blame for Soviet interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland [Ref. 1: p. 163].
2. The Afghans are using U.S. Stinger missiles against civilian aircraft [Ref. 1: p. 177].
3. Grain imported from the U.S. was needed by the Soviets only as cattle fodder [Ref. 1: p. 122].
4. There is not a trace of Soviet involvement in South Africa [Ref. 1: p. 176].
5. Khrushchev didn't really mean it when he said, "We will bury you!" [Ref. 1: p.150]

This collection of revisionist themes has a single message. It says, "You have nothing to fear from us!" It systematically counters indicators of threatening intent by the Communists and replaces them with revised explanations.

3. New Political Thinking

This grouping can be seen as the very heart of the work. Roughly one third of the book is devoted to these themes. The first of the six themes grouped here is the phrase *new political thinking* itself. It is considered separately because Gorbachev uses the phrase often enough to warrant tracking it and exploring it for meaning. Speaking in the context of answering letters from fighters for peace worldwide, Gorbachev writes,

Such communication with people from all over the world reinforces my conviction that the prospects for civilization are not hopeless, since the best minds and honest people think and worry about its present and future, and are ready to devote their talent, knowledge, time and emotional energy to preserving this world and building a better and more just one. So, while basing our policy on new thinking, we do not propose to confine ourselves to the ideas we are used to and to the political language that is typically ours. We have no intention whatsoever of converting everyone to Marxism. The new political thinking can, and must, imbibe the experience of all peoples and ensure the mutual enrichment and confluence of various cultural traditions. [Ref. 1: p. 157]

While Gorbachev would probably prefer that Western audiences focus on the statement "We have no intention of converting everyone to Marxism," this writer finds another formulation more striking. What does he mean precisely when he says, "So, while basing our policy on new thinking, we do not propose to confine ourselves to the ideas we are

used to and to the political language that is typically ours"? A reasonable and amplified paraphrase of that passage could read, "We will send new messages of calm and conciliation to the West using themes and symbols from the West's own cultural lexicon."

The remaining four themes in this grouping present in detail what is *new* in the new political thinking. First, it is presented as a "*moral high frontier*". It strives to have the advantage of moral ascendancy. This theme has a distinctly Western ring to it, and is unusual in Soviet writing for at least two reasons. The first reason is that the term *moral* in Soviet political and military writings often refers to motivational intangibles and is roughly equivalent to the word "morale" in American English. A second reason for saying it is unusual is that morality in the Western sense is not usually a factor in Soviet political decisionmaking because the Soviets are generally understood to be relativistic and materialistic pragmatists (in the Marxist senses of those words). Gorbachev is plainly claiming the moral high ground for new-thinking communists when he says,

No matter what the opponents of communism think, communism originated and exists in the interests of man and his freedom, in order to defend his genuine rights, and justice on earth. Communism has a tremendous potential for humanitarianism. That is why our shared world outlook, and the ideas, assessments, considerations and mutual benevolent criticism, which we exchange with our friends in spirit, are indispensable. They help to develop a new way of thinking and to apply politically the rich accumulation of international experience which reflects the interests and sentiments of the working people. [Ref. 1: p. 155]

Secondly, "*peace through disarmament*" is a major, if not central, component of new political thinking. *Perestroika* is replete with statements of this theme. One plea for Western disarmament stands out from the rest, as it takes direct aim against any efforts to redress Western strategic deficiencies.

In the West they talk about inequalities and imbalances. That's right, there are imbalances and asymmetries in some kinds of armaments and armed forces on both sides in Europe, caused by historical, geographical and other factors. We stand for eliminating the inequality existing in some areas, but not through a build-up by those who lag behind but through a reduction by those who are ahead. [Ref. 1: p. 203]

Western experts on security affairs have pointed out that such statements are misleading, because they usually portray the East-West conventional posture as one of overall equality.

A third, closely related theme is *peace through cooperation*. The observation has already been made that this approach is closely related to the CSCE experience in

Soviet writings. Notably, Gorbachev draws an analogy between the CSCE and the pan-Pacific conference he proposed in his July 1986 Vladivostok appeal.

There was much comment when it was suggested that there be in the foreseeable future a Pacific conference attended by all countries gravitating towards the ocean. This idea was put forward as a kind of working hypothesis, or, to be more precise, as an invitation to discussion. The similarity to Helsinki is explained by the fact that the world community does not yet have any other experience of this kind. It does not mean, however, that the European "model" can be transplanted to Asia-Pacific soil. But in our time any international experiment has some general, global traits. [Ref. 1: p. 183]

Finally, under the heading of new political thinking we find the theme of directly *appealing to the people* of the West. Gorbachev presents this theme as an imperative of the informational age when he says,

I think the new style in international relations implies extending their framework far beyond the limits of the diplomatic process proper. Parliaments, along with governments, are becoming increasingly active participants in international contacts, and this is an encouraging development. It points to a trend toward greater democracy in international relations. *The wide-scale invasion of this domain by public opinion, international and national public organizations is a sign of our times. Public, citizen diplomacy, a way of addressing the peoples directly, is becoming a standard means of interstate contact.* (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 1: pp. 158-9]

Here Gorbachev implicitly denies that this appeal is propagandistic since it is a "sign of our times" and "a standard means of interstate contact." Before new political thinking, the Western publics would have been termed an *ideological front*, and been subjected to propaganda by the Soviet State organs. New political thinking, with its friendlier vocabulary, has changed all that. Let us move from the components of new political thinking to the stimulus that Gorbachev reports impelled him to think in a new way, *nuclear fear*.

4. Nuclear Fear

This theme stands alone as a stark cornerstone around which the book is constructed. The following three paragraphs epitomize Gorbachev's numerous statements about the frightening effects of nuclear weapons.

Last but not least, there is one more reality which we must recognize. Having entered the nuclear age when the energy of the atom is used for military purposes, mankind has lost its immortality. In the past, there were wars, frightful wars which took millions upon millions of human lives, turned cities and villages into ruins and ashes and destroyed entire nations and cultures. But the continuation of humankind was not threatened. By contrast, now, if a nuclear war breaks out, every living thing will be wiped off the face of the Earth.

Even what is logically impossible, namely, that mankind can be annihilated many times over, has now become technically possible. The existing nuclear arsenals are so great that for every inhabitant of the Earth there is a charge capable of incinerating a huge area. Today, just one strategic submarine carries a destructive potential equal to several Second World Wars. And there are dozens of such submarines!

The arms race, just like nuclear war, is unwinnable. Continuing such a race on the Earth, and extending it into space, would accelerate the accumulation and modernization of nuclear weapons, the rate of which is already feverish. The world situation can become such that it would no longer depend on politicians but would become captive to chance. All of us face the need to learn to live at peace in this world, to work out a new mode of thinking, for conditions today are quite different from what they were even three or four decades ago. [Ref. 1: p. 138]

Faced with such a future, does Western man have any recourse beside new political thinking and accommodation with the Soviets?

5. Old Political Thinking

As if to answer the last question in the negative in most emphatic tones, Gorbachev presents a cluster of three themes that can together be labeled "old political thinking," and describes what he sees as an outmoded, dangerous alternative path to the Soviet plan for eliminating nuclear weapons.

The first of the three themes in this cluster contends that alliances are part of the old order and are dangerous. Regarding postwar Europe and the creation of NATO, Gorbachev says,

Because of NATO, Europe once again found itself harnessed to a chariot of war, this time one loaded with nuclear explosives. And today the main blame for the continued division of Europe must be placed on those who have turned it into an area of nuclear missile confrontation and are calling for a revision of the European borders, ignoring politico-territorial realities.

For a start, we have repeatedly suggested scrapping the military blocs, or at least the military wings of the two alliances. But since this proposition of ours has not been accepted, we must take this reality into account as well. Even so, we believe that, blocs or no blocs, we must still pave the way for a better world and for improved international relations that would at some stage lead to all military alliances being disbanded. [Ref. 1: p. 193]

Later in the same argument, Gorbachev says,

We resent the belief that Europe is doomed to confrontation between blocs and to a continual preparation for war against each other. That the socialist countries have not resigned themselves to that prospect is confirmed by the initiative, put forward by them, that led all Europe, the US and Canada to Helsinki. The Final Act adopted there showed real ways of attaining unity for the continent on peaceful and equitable basis. [Ref. 1: p. 193]

Here Gorbachev implicitly contrasts the "old political thinking" of the Western alliance -- a policy that depends on the strength of arms for security with the "new political thinking" he represents.

The second element of old political thinking is that of the inertia of the *military-industrial complex*. Speaking about U.S. foreign policy after the 1985 Geneva summit, Gorbachev lambasts President Reagan as an archetypical old political thinker who is acting at the behest of the military-industrial complex:

But what about the United States? I cited the facts, and again the question arose as to what the United States really wants if one is to judge by its real policies rather than its statements. Not only did the Administration abandon detente, it seemed scared by any manifestations of a thaw. I had to tell the Soviet people honestly whose interests such policies were expected to promote. Indeed, it was not the American people that wanted the military threat to increase -- was it? The US military-industrial complex had to be spoken about which, like the ancient Moloch, not only devours the immense resources of the Americans and other peoples, but also devours the fruits of the efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. [Ref. 1: p. 233]

This quote contains a biblical allusion to Moloch, a brazen idol that was the object of fiery infant sacrifices in the Hinnom valley outside ancient Jerusalem. Presumably Gorbachev is arguing that the American military-industrial complex is actually worshipping arms and sacrificing its children thereby while it claims to be deterring Soviet aggression through the capability to exert armed force. Gorbachev's arguments in this critique of old political thinking amount to "demonizing" his critics in the West.

When imagery, analogy, archetype and other rhetorical devices are inadequate to drive a point home, Gorbachev is capable of literary streetfighting. This is the tactic employed in Gorbachev's reaction to a French journalist's skepticism over his sincerity.

However, there are ideologists and politicians who continue to sow mistrust towards the Soviet Union. The majority of West European countries, following in the wake of the US, publish a great many hysterical articles, but, as always, the French right-wing press is the most zealous. It is simply horrified by the very prospect of a better situation in Europe. Take, for example, the French weekly *L'Express*. On 6 March 1987 it ascribed to us a desire to establish domination over Europe. An article published under the glaring title "Gorbachev and Europe" is patterned after Little Red Riding Hood and the Big Bad Wolf.

I thought: could European readers, European nations be so naive as to believe such scribbling? We have faith in the common sense of the Europeans, and we realize that sooner or later they will know the truth from lies. Judging by the published results of public opinion polls, the majority of people in Western Europe seem to appreciate the Soviet Union's open European policy aimed at putting an end to the constant quarrels on that continent. [Ref. 1: p. 198]

Another example of his capacity for "literary streetfighting" is Gorbachev's reaction to the free world's interpretation of his 1986 Vladivostok speech as potentially threatening as "a 'caveman-like' response to our initiatives." [Ref. 1: p. 181]

To summarize, Gorbachev portrays "old political thinking" as retrograde, dangerous, and ignorant.

6. Strength and Resolve

The journey through *Perestroika* has been for the most part a bright highway of peace, cooperation, and disarmament. In this theme of *strength and resolve*, Gorbachev has, in effect, hedged his bet by rattling the sword just in case the pen does not convince the West to accept his offers of a postnuclear world. If this interpretation seems perhaps overstated or cynical, consider this warning to Secretary of State Shultz regarding the Pershing IA missiles in West Germany:

I told the US Secretary of State: "Do you really think that we are so weak as to be ready and willing to woo your Administration endlessly? Or maybe you think that we are more interested in the development of Soviet-American relations and the American side, consequently, has nothing to do for its part? If you do, that is an illusion, an extremely dangerous illusion. I say this directly without any diplomatic wrappings." [Ref. 1: p. 248]

This threat to the United States seems out of character for the architect of a new peaceful world program. Under the banner of *strength and resolve* in another passage, Gorbachev warns the West that the Soviet people are sufficiently hardened and resilient to withstand any military challenge to their security.

I ask the reader to take a look at the experience of postwar decades. The Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War in a very difficult condition. Yes, we had won the struggle against fascism, won together with the US and other anti-Hitler coalition participants. But whereas not a single enemy bomb was dropped and not a single enemy shot was heard on the US mainland, a large part of the territory of our country was an arena for the fiercest battles. Our losses -- both human and material -- were enormous. Nevertheless, we succeeded in restoring what had been destroyed, in building up our economic potential and in confidently tackling our defensive tasks. Is this not a lesson for the future? [Ref. 1: p. 219]

Gorbachev lashed out at the "French right-wing press" in general for their old political thinking, and at one French magazine in particular for likening him to a wolf in sheep's clothing. In the first five groupings of themes, Gorbachev systematically elaborated his claim to represent a collective of harmless and peaceful lambs. In this last theme, however, he shows remarkably large canine teeth for that docile species.

F. CONCLUSIONS

To this writer, the current Soviet peace program championed by General Secretary Gorbachev can be summarized as a multi-faceted call on the West to pursue negotiated reductions in nuclear armaments and thus create a nuclear free world by the year 2000. This appeal offers seven areas of motivation to the West for disarmament:

1. The assertion that nuclear weapons are a terrible evil in themselves and their very existence is a threat.
2. The Soviet Union has abandoned its threatening position relative to the West due in part to its need for internal economic rebuilding, and its recognition that nuclear war is unthinkable.
3. The Third World cries out to be developed, and resources need to be diverted from arms to aid.
4. Other problems need attention. Domestic challenges (in the West) need to be met.
5. The U.S. will sacrifice its high standard of living if it does not stop spending so much on armaments.
6. The U.S.S.R. will not surrender its position of strategic strength relative to the U.S. American nuclear arms and strategic defenses will be countered by Soviet strength.

General Secretary Gorbachev presents the threat of nuclear destruction as the central and dominant reality of the age. By doing this he appears to be offering a selectively edited reality for his readers in the West. The elimination of nuclear weapons *is* the compelling imperative that springs from this reality. If, however, a larger, more inclusive reality is operant, one that makes room for hegemonial intentions on the part of the Soviets, the compelling imperative may be to maintain and even improve Western nuclear capabilities, offensive and defensive, and to foster a more informed public opinion in the West.

Because much of Gorbachev's impact on the West has been enhanced by his personal charisma and force of personality, a few brief concluding comments on this unique CPSU General Secretary are in order.

The popular impression that Gorbachev is a dynamic, new-thinking, brave innovator do not seem justified when his "new political thinking" is examined in a fuller organizational, strategic and historical context. The evidence reviewed in this chapter demonstrates that his appeals are consistent with, and in some cases direct extensions of, the policies of his predecessors in his current office. The content is not new, but the packaging does give the appearance of novelty and innovation.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This section is devoted to summarizing the results of this examination of contemporary Soviet peace initiatives. The documentary evidence supporting these conclusions will not be recapitulated so as to permit a concise resume of the findings.

Four broad conclusions have been drawn from this study: First, the current Soviet "peace program" gives much evidence of consistency and continuity with earlier Soviet initiatives of the Brezhnev period and before. Second, nothing in these policy statements indicates that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned its desire for a worldwide victory of Soviet-style "socialism." Third, the terminology used by the Soviets to describe the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and those who resist the expansion of Soviet power has become less belligerent over the years. Fourth, contemporary Soviet peace campaigns have been directed against key defenses that have traditionally afforded protection to Western societies. Among these are:

1. OUR VOCABULARY -- The Soviets have claimed the linguistic high ground of peace, progress, new thinking, cooperation, security and relaxation of tensions as their unique domain.
2. OUR HUMANE VALUES -- In their treatment of the nuclear issue -- and more generally -- the Soviets have attempted to dramatically highlight the "inhumanity" of armed resistance to their threats.
3. OUR GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES -- By trying to encourage pacifistic sentiments within elites, interest groups and politicians, the Soviets have attempted to have an impact on our own policy making mechanisms.
4. OUR SUPRANATIONAL IMPULSES -- By drawing attention to the "overarching, shared goal" of avoiding mutual destruction by nuclear weapons, the Soviets have sought to diminish the role of the nation as the traditional protector of its citizens.
5. OUR MATERIALISM -- Recent Soviet "pleas for peace" have consistently highlighted the claim that continued U.S. force modernization programs would cost the U.S. its high standard of living.
6. OUR MISTRUST OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY -- Gorbachev, in taking his appeals for "peace" and "new political thinking" directly to the people, has capitalized on both the American tendency toward suspicion of governmental sources of information and the openness of Western societies.
7. OUR DISDAIN OF ARMS -- Gorbachev's appeals have capitalized on the recurring notion in certain Western traditions that the evil of war stems from the arms that are used to fight wars.

8. OUR FEAR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- Soviet messages to the West have accentuated the horrific character of nuclear war. The message just below the surface seems to read, "better to compromise with us than to prolong the risk of being incinerated."
9. OUR VISION OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES DIVIDING DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM -- By highlighting unifying shared goals, the Soviets have attempted to discount the fundamental political differences between the Soviet bloc and the free world.
10. OUR PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT -- By "putting on a conciliatory face" the Soviets have attempted to defuse defensive instincts that have motivated the West toward military preparedness in the past.
11. OUR RECORD OF THE HISTORY OF THE SOVIET PERIOD -- By a systematic process of revision the Soviets have attempted to alter our understanding of historical reality.

It can be inferred from the above conclusions that future Soviet initiatives may contain:

- Appeals that are gauged to have maximum impact by interacting synergistically with Western value systems and perceptions.
- Approaches that follow the apparent Helsinki model of international fora that result in generalized agreements.
- Implicit and subtle assurances that Soviet proposals may be backed up by force of Soviet arms, if they deem it necessary.

One final and nagging question remains. What will be the long-term Western response to the new type of long-term disarmament campaigns initiated by the Soviet Union? The words of an ancient Westerner, the Roman poet Horace, shed some light on the heritage of Western man regarding the nobility of virtue undefended by arms. His ode *Integer Vitae* (Ode XXII)⁸ is offered here for reflection on that very large question:

He who is upright, kind, and free from error,
Needs not the aid of arms of men to guard him;
Safely he moves, a child to guilty terrors,
Strong in his virtues.

What, tho' he journey o'er the burning desert,
Or climb alone the dreadful, dangerous mountains,
Or taste the waters of the famed Hydaspes,
Gods will attend him.

⁸ Translated by W.N. Eayrs

Place me where fate denies to man a dwelling,
Conscious of right, all other cares neglecting:
There could I live, thy charms and virtues telling,
Sweet smiling maiden.

If America were to lay aside its nuclear defenses as Gorbachev proposes, would "uprightness, kindness, and freedom from error" protect it in the contingency of Soviet aggression? Depending on the effectiveness of current Soviet initiatives, Gorbachev's "new political thinking" may well need to be countered by "new political resolve" in the West. This resolve would need to begin with a recognition that we are indeed at peril, and that we dare not exchange our arms for an aegis of virtue that would make us dependent on our foes' assurances that they are harmless and benevolent.

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Naval War College
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36. Col. K.F. Jodoin 1
Chief Politico-Military Divison (DAMO-SSM)
The Pentagon (Room 3B545)
Washington, DC 20391
37. LCOL J.F. O'Neil 1
Head Soviet/WTO/NATO Area
Director of Intelligence
HQMC (INTP)
Arlington Annex 3135
Washington, DC 20380
38. Col. Howard Guiles 1
Chief Europe/NATO Div
AF XXXE
The Pentagon (Room 4D1072)
Washington DC 20391
39. Col. R.M. Naab 1
European Division
Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)
The Pentagon (Room 2D956)
Washington, DC 20391

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EUCOM/CENTCOM Branch
Joint Operations Division (J-33)
The Pentagon (Room 2B885I)
Washington, DC 20391 | 1 |
| 41. | Commanding Officer
U.S.S. COCHRANE (DDG 21)
FPO San Francisco 96662 | 2 |

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